It is a long time since we met in Florence on 9 December 2011 at the forum on ‘La via d’uscita’ (‘The way out’) and it seems even longer because of the intensification of the austerity attacks which have been hitting Europe after the 2008 crisis. The push from the movements has not weakened, even if, as Donatella Della Porta observes, this second wave is more national in character compared to the first one, the Global Justice mobilisation. But it is important that we are moving from protest to proposals, from the generous but unrealistic ‘We won’t pay for your crisis’ – indeed we are paying for it everyday – to ‘How is an alternative possible’.

The powers that be and the ruling institutions seem to be the only ones not hearing this voice, when indeed they don’t attempt to suffocate it, as in Greece and Spain. They keep following the neoliberal road, imposing the burden of the crisis onto the shoulders of the least wealthy countries and onto the subaltern classes. It’s a cruel and dead-ended way, and it’s not only the hardcore Marxists who keep reiterating this, but also scholars like Krugman and Stiglitz, and some of our local voices, like Luciano Gallino or Guido Rossi. Portugal, Spain, Italy, and, more dramatically, Greece, are in, or are entering, recession. Growth does not take off, while the debt to pay the debt is growing (by four points here in Italy). Whatever Mario Monti says, recovery is nowhere to be seen.

In France, the Hollande government and its small alterations, have announced the fiscal norms for the wealthiest, which has stirred turmoil from the Right and all of the mainstream media. This has actually affected public opinion, and you can hear poor people in the local markets, repeating rhetoric like, ‘if the government taxes them, you can’t blame them for going abroad’. In France at least one firm per week goes out of business or relocates abroad, the projected national growth has been reduced from 0.8 to 0.2, public services are being heavily cut (apart from education and healthcare), the unemployed number is more than three million (10% of the labour force) and that number is growing.

The numbers of unemployed in Europe has reached almost 26 million, a figure which does not include – which is a real scam – the millions of casual workers, employed only for a few days per month or per year (Gallino, Fumagalli). The ECB managed to stop excessive financial speculation against the most indebted countries, but these countries have had to accept the imposition of extreme conditions, whilst the strongest countries are attempting to put their spending under control, and veto it if necessary. The reluctance of the ‘hard working’ North helping the ‘lazy’ South shows the weakness of continental solidarity.

As soon as the Euro seemed to be saved, the intention to move to a two-speed Europe was revealed. If it were a cruel but an effective therapy it would make a bit of sense. But it’s not. It doesn’t solve the public fiscal crisis and it pushes 90% of the population to despair. The richest 10% and especially the richest 1% are continuing to feast on the backs of the rest. The result is that everywhere, a new far Right is emerging which blames not only the masters, but Europe and its mechanisms too. The arena of the Left is being conquered by fascist models that had appeared to be finished at the end of WWII. But the most powerful are managing to take advantage of what once was the obvious and maybe a rather crude resentment against the rich. The Left, in their fear, seem to have forgotten the lessons of the twentieth century.

The question we must ask at the new meeting at Florence 10+10 – starting today – is why the explanations, the power, and the mobilisations of the movements have failed so far to open a breach in the effective wall of the neoliberal governments, and make no impact on the majority of the population, who are voting for them. On what kind of disillusion, disorientation, and mistrust are they founded? One out of every two Sicilians did not vote last week, which has never happened before. Between our focused mobilisations based on solidarity and the institutions, there is the space of abstention and ‘grillismo (from Beppe Grillo – Movimento Cinque Stelle), opening another crack in our battered democracy. We are now facing very urgent tasks and the time is short.

It seems clear to me that we must strengthen the unity of those moving in the same direction as us. We must put reasonable pressure on the unions, who are divided within each country and within the continent itself, even when the masters they are facing are the same. In this way they can be easily attacked by the local Marchionne of each country. We must ensure that all the historical Left forces and their supporters fully face the facts that they have been disoriented and have sometimes switched to the other side. They are being continually forced into compromises, and their influence, once mighty, is being ostensibly eroded. True, a cultural and moral tsunami happened from the 1980s up to today, and it is stupid to say that it’s just that ‘the times are changing’. Capitalism won, there’s no way around it. It is now up to us to expose its cracks as well as its inhumanity. The evidence of the ecological arguments should not be the object of disputes, but a great boost for the best tradition of the Left.

For what concerns Sbilanciamoci and its many collaborators, the forecasts stated in ‘Rotta d’Europa’ are all becoming the reality. If our persistence was useful in obtaining a small taxation on financial transactions – not a great achievement – we must proceed on this road with reason and determination. The power of finance is still vastly out of proportion, and it is a continual source of increasing inequalities and the corruption of democracy. Europe accepted with ease that foreign corporations could steal its know-how on its territory, only to depart after a few years leaving entire areas deserted and thousands of workers unemployed – the latest case is that of the French iron metallurgical industry, that Mittal is getting rid of. This exposes the naïve adoration of the markets, that fear one devil only, that of nefarious protectionism. The same could be said for any control on the movement of capital, and for tax evasion. Even in the USA, which used to doing anything for their companies, the threat of ‘if you raise my taxes I’ll leave’ is answered by saying that ‘if you fiscally leave, you’ will lose your citizenship.’

There is much to be changed, and we need to open a new way for growth. A responsible, eco-compatible growth, which is able to get rid of all the waste caused by the way we live our lives. There’s no money? We are burdened by the debt? Well, the Southern European countries, trying to get France involved, must renegotiate together and must firmly renegotiate the timing of repayment. The tightening of the noose around the necks of Greece and Spain must be stopped. What could happen? Germany will start a war against us? I do not think so. We are more constrained by our cowardice than by the threat of Mrs. Merkel, who has her own troubles and has possibly a fatal deadline in less than one year. Current European policies are indefensible. Neoliberalism is unable to come out of the swamp which it has created.

Rossana Rossanda is the author of ‘The Comrade from Milan’, a much lauded account of the European Left in the twentieth century, published by Verso. Available here : http://www.versobooks.com/books/476-the-comrade-from-milan

Harsh austerity policies have been hitting broad segments of the population for a long time, but today their force has increased. One of the questions which are often posed to social movement scholars (and to activists as well) is: why, facing such a strong challenge, the mobilisation keeps being so relatively limited? Why – differently from Spain, Greece, and the USA, and Iceland before them – there seems to be so little protest?

First of all, it is necessary to observe that protest exists, grows, and is focused on demands regarding social rights and real democracy. Research that we carried out, together with Lorenzo Mosca and Louisa Parks, on the protests reported by a national daily newspaper in 2011, shows that not only is mobilisation high, but it is focused on social issues. Almost half of the reported protest events involve workers with stable employment, more than half if we add casual workers More than one fifth is student protest. Moreover, even if the unions are very present in the mobilisations, important actors are also informal social movement groups, i.e. the occupied social centres and various kinds of associations. It is not a case that the statistics on strikes signal a 25% surge in the last year.

Although anti-austerity mobilisations are numerous, it is true that, in the last months, the big demonstrations that contributed to the downfall of Berlusconi’s government were not to be seen. This is also a signal that neoliberal policies could not have been effectively imposed by a libertine and in many ways delegitimised head of government. The shift from Berlusconi to Monti did not mean a change in the direction of public policies, but the buying (for quite a cheap price) of the support for them from the ex-opposition (i.e. the centre-Left Democratic Party). If the 15 October 2011 demonstration, with its great mobilisation capacity, was an exception, its evolution did not facilitate the recovery of a process of protest accumulation at all.

A first reason for the difficulty to network the existing mobilisations is to be found in the crisis itself. Social movement research has repeatedly proved that protest does not increase with deprivation (neither absolute nor relative), but when resources are available to those that want to challenge the decisions of the government. The studies on the labour movement have shown that strikes increase with full employment, not with unemployment. Insecurity discourages collective action, and the depressive effect of the crisis is aggravated by the new kind of labour market. It is certainly harder for casual workers to mobilise to defend their rights, because they can be blackmailed, have less free time, and often lack the physical spaces for aggregation that were so important for the labour movement.

If this kind of explanation, structural so to speak, has some grain of truth, it does not help us to understand why in Spain, Greece, or the US (but also in Italy in other periods) the groups most hit by the economic crisis and by the growing inequality produced by neoliberal policies (which in addition are responsible for the crisis itself) mobilised in broad and visible protest movements, from Indignados to Occupy. Moreover casual workers in Italy did produce significant protests, especially in the first half of the last decade.

Social movement research provides us with another explanation, more suitable for the Italian case. In order to grow, protest needs political opportunities. Among them, the position of potential allies like parties and unions is fundamental, they are important to broaden the mobilisation, for the logistic resources they can offer, and, even more, to increase the political influence of the protest. Mass protest was more substantial and visible when it was against centre-Right governments, when it found the support of parties and unions. This is especially true in Italy where, reciprocal critiques notwithstanding, the relationship between movements and Left parties (when they existed) has always been intense.

These allies were there against Berlusconi, but a grand coalition government like Monti’s has drastically reduced the opportunities for political alliances. Parties that are supporting the neoliberal government in the parliament would not be credible allies for those who are opposing its policies. Moreover, the incumbent government has succeeded in propagating his self-depiction of a ‘technical government’.

There is little empirical evidence for this self-representation. Inter alia, it is sufficient to have a quick look at most ministers’ careers within institutions that cannot be neutral about their policies, or at the measures of deregulation, privatisation, and reduction of the will and capacity of the state to intervene in reducing the inequalities produced by the market.

Clearly this self-representation as technical government has caught on with the media and beyond. Not only the main national newspapers are critically praising ‘Super Mario’. Even the academic institutions, that in the past have carefully cultivated an image of political neutrality, today often provide a political stage for a head of government that claims to be technical. This stage is then used for strictly political and ideologically neoliberal speeches.

No doubt, this Italian anomaly contributes in explaining the difficulties to network the multiple streams of protest that exist. Anyhow, this diffuse resistance could contribute to an aggregation and politicisation of the mobilisations, not just through the challenge against specific policies, but also by underlining the political and neoliberal nature of this government.

The feeble majority was really unexpected. We were conscious that the centre right had significant social and cultural strength, since it also obtains significant working-class votes, so is often capable of dictating the political agenda. However, no one imagined that after five years of Berlusconi’s government there would be a substantial draw between the votes of the centre-right and those of the centre-left. The particularly complicated voting system played its part in making one of the two chambers, the Senate, ungovernable.

The structural weakness of the government favoured the political bribery of centre-oriented factions close to the influential organisations (in particular Confindustria, an association of the Italian industrial managers) and of the Catholic Church. This rendered even more difficult than we had imagined our initiative for the redistribution of wealth to the advantage of workers. Even those objectives that seemed, at first glance, relatively easier, such as the acknowledgement of the civil rights same-sex partners, were difficult to achieve.

The weakness of the centre-left coalitions is a faithful mirror of the strength of the social values of the right faction. This strength must be taken into consideration not only in drawing conclusions about Prodi’s government but also when redirecting our future policies. This does not mean that we have to automatically ‘moderate’ our intentions. However, it is important to keep in mind that the electorate is culturally more and more distant from the values of the left-wing parties.

We certainly overestimated the ability to mobilise political movements against even the most moderate policies of the Prodi government. Some positive connection was established, for example, with the mobilisation against the privatization of the water. For the rest, there was a strong difficulty in connecting with both the most ‘radical’ movements (such as the one against the TAV in Susa Valley, or the one against the NATO base in Vincenza), which were ignored and criticised by the government, and with those of the ‘moderate’ actors (including the trade unions), which chose to negotiate and lobby largely without promoting demonstrations. The result was a scenario completely different from what the PRC had foreseen, rendering its role in the government more difficult, and at times, isolated.

What did you learn from the inside about the crisis of the political institutions, which has always been so central to Rifondazione’s analysis?

The crisis in the Italian institutions is confirmed by the incapacity of the government to respond to the basic necessities of marginalised groups. This incapacity derives principally from the political choice to prioritise economic growth and the management of public debt over wealth distribution. However, the crisis has worsened because of the country’s institutional structure, especially as regards welfare.

We came across this during our experience in the government. Except for the pension system and national health services – which constantly faced attempts to cut their budgets, reduce services or privatize them, but which have relatively “robust” institutional mechanisms – the institutions managing unemployment, poverty, disability, state housing and other social problems are subject to little central control. Their organisation is very fragmented, with a strong role for the regional offices, religious associations and the non-profit sector. In particular, the non-profit sector is often synonymous with contract-less, informal, underpaid work, which implies low quality standards in the social services.

All of this is typical of the contemporary form of capitalism, which generates rising social uncertainty, so should be addressed by an efficient welfare system that is equally available for all.

On the other hand, the institutions have demonstrated a strong capacity to involve in their governance structures all of those associations that look after the interests of citizens, in particular those in disadvantaged circumstances. In fact, from this point of view, the Italian political institutions are not so weak.

An updated analysis of the ‘crisis of the political institutions’ is needed, therefore, which takes into account the fact that this crisis is mitigated by a counter force operating against it.

What lessons do you draw about how to open up a dynamic of transforming these institutions – and about the role of the party and the movements in this process? Is such a transformation possible? If so, under what conditions?

What I have mentioned above demonstrates that there is closure in the institutions when dealing with general economic policies. On the other hand, they are also very open in their day-to-day administration. What is needed now is for the institutions to open up to more complex solutions regarding the [economic] necessities of their citizens, beyond simply their openness to collaboration with citizens’ associations.

For this to happen, there would need to be a shift in the balance of forces – brought on by (a) the worsening of the Italian crisis (even in relation to the foreseen global economic crisis); (b) the associated failure of the moderate left wing project (as embodied by the new Democratic Party) and (c) the ability of workers and citizens to organise themselves in committees that are not simply about civil defense. It isn’t easy to foresee a situation when these factors coincide.

Meanwhile, the PRC could unite the different left-wing factions to construct a ‘critical mass’ that is necessary for political effectiveness, reconstructing its militant base, gaining political trust and re-orienting itself in relation to its electorate. Secondly, it could take advantage of the decentralisation of Italy to act at regional and even local level, to bypass the closure of opportunities on the national sphere. Thirdly, the PRC could contribute to the construction of a popular self-organised network to act as a counterpart to both the regional and national governance.

All this, and above all the last point mentioned, presupposes a reevaluation of the role of movements and of the party. On the one hand, the limits of the political movements must be considered – including their failure, sometimes, to reach out to the broader public. As a result of their language and practices that are often as far from the needs of the people as the political parties themselves are. However, these limits can not be overcome by pedagogic intervention from the party. The political movements and the associations that form part of their governing structures have to identify the problems and solutions based on their own practices and background. On the other hand, a political party is need more than ever, that can have a wider vision than that of the PRC, and that can be more competent and more grounded in society.

How did the PRC prepare for its role in government? With the benefit of hindsight are there further ways it should have prepared?

I believe the PRC was not prepared enough for its participation in the government and did not have a proper political culture for this challenging task. Partly, this was inevitable: inexperience does count.

However, there was at least one avoidable error: that of interpretation. A group within the PRC thought this to be a government of change, based on a dynamic compromise between the workers movement and some of the more economically advanced parts of the ‘bourgeoisie’. But the conditions for this to occur were not there. At present, there is no interest from the economically well-off to find a ‘dynamic compromise’. Namely a compromise based on the acknowledgement of the autonomy of the workers’ movement, on the adequate ‘payment’ for production (rather than simply increasing profit and growth), on acknowledging the collective knowledge and creative ability of the workforce as a determinant in social innovation and thus in production itself. Only the unfolding of the economic crisis in conjunction with a resumption of social conflict could, possibly, construct the conditions for such a compromise.

The Prodi government was more of a compromise between political factions where the moderate left could occasionally be forced (for electoral reasons) to make some concessions to the radical left. This ‘exchange’ could have led to some positive results. In fact, Prodi’s government had recuperated some part of the tax evasions that were instigated by Berlusconi’s government, and part of this wealth – as a result of initiatives by the PRC and other radical left parties – should now have been redistributed to workers. Maybe it is not a coincidence that the government has failed exactly when something tangible could have been achieved. But, in any case, even if such a result would have given some hope to workers, it would not have been a real change. Deluding the electorate and militants by speaking of the possibilities of real change was a big mistake, because after the illusions came the disillusions.

In brief, there was a wrong analysis of the balance of forces, of the strong influence of dominant social and economic groups, and of the nature of the centre-left.

How should lessons from this period of government shape a new phase for the left in Italy?

The first lesson is that a real ‘progressive’ government is only possible if the mechanisms of force are different between the social classes. Should that not be the case, and for some reason we are obliged to participate in the government, the limits of our ability to negotiate and reach our objectives must be explained with far greater clarity and sincerity.

The second lesson is that, to participate in a government and to act as an effective opposition, a left leader must be able to count consistently on 10 per cent of the electorate. Most importantly, this leader must address the working class and construct a social based from those who been stably organized, starting with the trade unions. Finally, such leadership requires a person who can meet with intellectual workers (environmental activists, lawyers, economists, architects, etc.), whose inputs are essential for defining the policies or for opposing in a constructive manner the policies defined by others. There is a need for a ‘social’ and ‘competent’ party, in other words.

The Sinistra Arcobaleno has been born in the hope that it might solve this problem. The party must overcome the quantitative limits of Rifondazione, not dissolving the different parts that make it up, but constructing a federal structure that includes not only the different political currents but those associations that want to sign up. It must construct ‘case della sinistra’ [left houses] all over Italy, capable of offering firstly a place of social aggregation and secondly, a place for discussions and political initiatives. An alliance between the social classes must be built between the workers and the intellectuals (who are no more than workers of a particular type and who, like other workers, suffer similarly uncertain and precarious labour and social conditions).

The political phase that has just opened is more diverse than the previous one. The political parties of the Ulivo and the La Margherita have come together under the banner of the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD). This party is in the Blairite, New Labour mold. It will run for election by itself, breaking its previous relations with the radical left, and move in a more centrist direction. Even if Berlusconi’s new party, born of the merger (for now only for electoral reasons) of his Forza Italia party and Fini’s post-fascist party, is definitely ahead in the polls, although the PD is gaining some support. It is not improbable, after the elections, that we will see a political accord between Veltroni and Berlusconi. In any case, the radical left seems likely to a face long period of opposition.

A strong Sinistra Arcobaleno opposition, capable of capitalizing on the difficulties that the next government will face, as well as the decentralisation of policy making; and capable of reconstructing its social ties, has the capacity to make decisive progress. It could organise the resistance and prepare the conditions for a broader change in future. This is our challenge.

Paolo Ferrero is an MP for the Partito della Rifondazione Communista and was Minister of Social Solidarity in the Prodi Government.

On 24 and 25 February, 250 stalls were set up throughout the region to collect support for the Veneto Association of La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno. Anyone could adhere by donating two Euros or by reading the programme and participating in any party-led initiatives.

The Association has very little electoral backing in Veneto, where the majority of people support Berlusconi and the Lega parties, so we have had to promote a plural and socially engaged political structure from the bottom up. Although we receive support from the four main parties that make up the Arcobaleno coalition (Rifondazione, Verdi, Comunisti Italiani and the Sinistra Democratica), our Association aims to develop itself independently and autonomously from them. For instance, while the parties of La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno have created a single, unified group within the Regional Council, support for our Association is on an individual basis and it is up to members themselves to organise meetings and decide if and how they will establish themselves at the local level. To some degree, this initiative aims to resolve the organisational problems facing the left in light of the imminent elections. However, it also wishes to address the long-term problems that our recent government crisis has revealed, such as how the left intends to represent society and take actions to improve it.

Unfortunately, the present electoral system is such that, at the national level the eligible candidates for the next general election will be chosen by the parties’ secretaries, involving very low levels of participation. This is due to what are known as ‘blocked electoral lists,’, which have greatly hampered the public’s ability to participate in the selection process of those who are standing for election.

How do you think the left’s election campaign should be presented? What lessons can be learnt from other campaigns, such as Nicky Vendola’s in Bari?

Ideally, the Veneto Association would like to take advantage of the electoral campaign by welcoming a wide range of social movements, groups and association that are already operating within civil society. This would serve to overcome the traditional barriers that exist between small parties and the society they aim to represent.

Regrettably, in the Veneto region, we lack the right conditions to breed a successful and charismatic leader similar to Nicky Vendola. On the contrary, we must rely on balanced common interests and grass roots politics. In this sense, the council elections for the city of Vicenza could prove to be an important experience. For instance, it appears that even within the Democratic Party, Achille Variati, a politician who openly supports the No-Dal Molin campaign, will run for the mayoral elections (1). Therefore, the council elections can effectively be seen as a referendum against the new American military base.

What are the prospects for La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno? How would you like to see this coalition develop and do you think it can potentially lead a new political era for the Italian left?

One hundred pages would not suffice to answer these questions! My opinion is that La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno is the only left wing project worth believing in. I am aware that it would entail a clear break from the past and that we would have to move away from a logic of division to one of cooperation between many different groups (i.e. between communists, socialists, environmentalists, feminists, anarchists, liberals etc.). This would finally signal the end of an approach influenced by the Third International and encourage us to take new, if not unexplored paths instead. For this reason, social forums could be of extraordinary help and guidance. The modalities are decisive. To paraphrase Ghandi: ‘The means are to the ends as the seeds are to their fruit.’ We must experiment with new models of representation that aim to diffuse power away from the top by decentralising it and avoiding the creation of hierarchies.

The lessons we learnt from participating within Prodi’s government are catastrophic because we were deprived of our autonomy. Above all, we were implicated in a crisis of reliability, representation and of politics in general. For this reason, we must consider a truthful assessment of the Prodi government’s failed experiences.

Will you be a candidate? If not what would be your advice to any candidate who might win?

No, surely not. My personal experience has been utterly negative. I have matured the belief that it is impossible to bring about any real change from within Parliament. It is a colossal waste of time, if not worse. I believe that representatives and those who are elected should function as watchdogs for the people with very clear mandates from the electorate. We must enter institutions, but we must enter them with the intention of destroying them. The State is not a neutral instrument. Its logic is to preserve power indeterminately and to absorb anyone who becomes a part of it. This is the government culture that has gone missing in the left.

Paolo Cacciari is a professor of architecture and a longstanding member of the Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (PRC). From 1995 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2005 he held the position of Regional Counsellor for Venice and, more recently, was a PRC delegate in Italy’s parliament.(1)Dal Molin is a military airport in the province of Vicenza that has been chosen as the location for a new American military base. No-Dal Molin is a local campaigning group that aims to stop these plans from materialising.

We wouldn’t be telling the truth if we blamed simply the Prodi government for the current weakness of social movements. These movements are facing a crisis all over the world, with the exception, perhaps, of Latin America. Moreover, the weakness of Prodi’s government was in part an outcome of a more general social and cultural regression. It is evident, for example, in the emergence of racism, in indifference in the face of war, in widespread everyday violence, especially towards women, in the defeat of the referendum on abortion and in the weakening of social rights including workers rights. The decline in workers rights has meant a high rate of accidents in the workplace which culminated recently in the deaths of seven employees in a fire at Thyssen Krupp.

Prior to the Prodi government, leftist social and trade union movements were growing, with positive programmes for change. But we needed some tangible results from the government for these to have a real social impact. This did not materialise. The internal political dynamics of this fractious and heterogeneous government rendered it incapable of making the most of the potential of the movements to achieve change. In particular, the divisions which constantly freeze up the left (a characteristic of the left even prior to the Prodi government) meant that no political support was offered to social struggles, including those around improving employment conditions or opposing the war.

Even the most influential confederation of trade unions, the Cgil – which had fought and won a significant battle to preserve ‘L’articolo 18′ (which protects workers against unfair dismissal) and which participated massively to the anti-war movements – was quick to back down on its commitment to social movements. Recently, it has even stopped mentioning movements in its internal debates. At its Congress earlier this year, to which Prodi was invited, the Cgil clearly gave up on maintaining its autonomy. Other movement actors followed the Cgil’s attitude: both those supporting (and at least not opposing) the government and those openly against them. The autonomy of the movements has been undermined by a mistaken instinct to judge everything according to the actions of the government. This reactive approach – whether pro or anti government – and the failure to develop an autonomous perspective on the actual issues facing society has been a very damaging, stopping everyone from analysing the real situation.

Were the movements prepared for the experience of the radical left in government? Looking back with the wisdom of hindsight, how should you/the movements have prepared better?

The first lesson to be learnt is that the autonomy of the movements is an essential principle necessary for their continued existence (the same is true for trade unions who wish to keep their connections with the movements). In no circumstances should this be compromised. A lesson here is that the movements should have put more thought into distinguishing themselves from the political left (even if radical) during the Berlusconi government. This would have put them in a stronger position vis a vis the Prodi government. The latter government would even have benefited from more powerful movements. Had the movements been stronger, the parties which dominated this coalition in parliament would not prevail.

For example, the main priority of the Prodi government was to eradicate Italy’s financial deficit, which was surely an important goal, but it became an excuse to forget other important social objectives that needed to be addressed. Stronger, more autonomous, movements would have been a counter pressure to this. The left had not prepared itself – through a careful and shared analysis – for the consequences of its participation in government. Perhaps some form of preparation drawing on those principles that made the European Social Forum in Florence – autonomy, unity and radicalism – might have been led to some successes.

What now? What lessons from the last two years need to be borne in mind in from a movement point of view, for the future of the Archebolena? At present it is dominated by political parties. What needs to be done/what conditions need to exist for it be more rooted in movements and social conflicts?

Some of the movements (which had already been weakened by years of conflict and bickering without reaching any tangible solutions) invested all of their hopes and expectations in the Prodi government. This in turn disappointed them. The government’s initial survival was more a consequence of “social peace” than (as it should have been) the result of social conflict combined with the government’s potential capacity to deliver solutions. In fact, the Government only delivered its promise to withdraw Italian troops from Iraq. It failed to deliver its other manifesto were not delivered, including withdrawal of our military presence in Afghanistan and also legislation to protect the rights of civil union. What is more, the military budget was increased and Prodi persisted in the expansion of the American military base in Vicenza. Other laws from the previous legislation, including the ‘legge 30′ on precarious employment, the Bossi-Fini law on immigration and the building of TAV all remained unchallenged, in spite of many protests and alternative proposals. (See Vittorio Longhi on the record of the Prodi government).

The Cgil, the other two trade union federations, Cisl and Uil, supported government policies on welfare without any prior consultation, that penalized the most active and socially rooted section of workers and unions. My union FIOM, the metalworkers union voted against these policies. Meanwhile the attack on the national contract on employment continues. This contract has been a fundamental means of defending workers’ interests. The employers want to bring all negotiations back to the company level, exchanging a rise in salaries with more flexibility, hence worsening employment conditions by increasing productivity at the expense of the workers’ freedom and health. The trade union federations do not seem to be resisting this call of the employers.

For these reasons, the centre-left Government that has just fallen has not been a good experience for the movements. Today, we find ourselves weakened and without a strategy. We should, however, be capable of facing up to our responsibilities. We should be able to work – and already we are starting to – reconstruct alliances and develop shared perspectives. The work of the unions – and increasing the social movements – has become, more than ever, a labour of Sisyphus – as Rosa Luxembourg once pointed out . But perhaps we can learn from this and recognise that we must restart by treasuring past experiences and take action to construct and re-construct.

The Italian paradox is that vibrant movements do exist but they are incapable of developing their own solutions, or where they do, they have unable to gain the political support to build on such solutions. It need not always be like this. It only the movements and the left parties could learn to recognise each other’s significance yet keep a mutual distance and act upon their respective ideas, we would already be taking a step forward in the right direction. However in the dynamics of politics and parties, a mimickery seems to prevail, whereby ‘differences’ never truly emerge and parties seem reluctant to distinguish themselves from one another (evidence of the political caste!).

Unless movements learn culturally to let go of government and institutional reference points, they will fail. They risk loosing their connections with society. Without these social roots they will be unable to act as necessary connecting points between society and institutions. Those trade unions who wish to maintain a relationship with the movements, because of a shared outlook, need to safeguard a strong and democratic relationship with the workers that they represent – ensuring that it is the workers who have the final say in the decision-making process. At the same time, we as trade unions must try to build widespread relationships and initiatives with all those who are trying to oppose war, racism and liberalism, in order to come up with alternatives and taking the best from each movement.

Even at the best of times this is very demanding cultural and practical endeavour. This is why it would have been very useful to have created a solid forum at the national level both before and after the Prodi government. It would have meant a real positive change in the Italian political, social, and cultural landscape. Novelties in this scene are emerging from ‘La Sinistra Arcobaleno’/ ‘Cosa Rossa’, from whom everyone expects, at least, clear objectives. An alternative determined against war, militarism, Vatican fundamentalism, environmental degradation, and instability in the workplace. The party is also expected to protect civil rights, support the interests of the working class, the unemployed, and propose more environmentally conscious policies. We shall see.

The second phase saw social movements finally connecting with people and local areas, thanks to focused campaigns against the privatisation of water and other public goods. Numerous territorial campaigns have sprung up ever since, capable of mobilising entire communities. These include campaigns against the Vicenza military base, the development of high velocity trains (TAV) and incinerators, to mention a few. However, what brings most of these movements together is a mutual recognition that traditional tools of political representation have failed. Who decides the future of communities and their territories? Where are decisions made? These are the issues that truly concern new territorial movements, which are constantly looking for new models of participation.

Nowadays, we must also recognise that movements are severely fragmented. Although there is a mutual understanding that they will come to each other’s aid if necessary, this remains a defensive mechanism rather than one that encourages innovation. The fact that movements are under-represented within the media worsens this state of affairs, in a society where anything that exists outside the media isn’t even deemed real or taken into consideration. However, movements are not only lacking coordination and a constant exchange of ideas (on the topic of water, for example, a National Forum was organised to bring together all movements concerned with this issue) – what is really missing now, is the capacity to mobilise the masses, which, starting with Genova, had characterised the first phase.

The ‘Grillo’ Storm

Beppe Grillo seems to attract astonishingly vast audiences nowadays, particularly through his Internet blog. He and his massive following should be seen as an example of classical social movements. It resembles what Venezuelans call a ‘turba’, a swarm of people that suddenly aggregate around one topic, which, in this case, is the crisis of political representation. To a large extent, Grillo should be credited with building a widespread sense of unification around this particular issue as well as others, such as the relevance of environmental concerns in contemporary society.

The political elite in Italy imitates the mechanisms of large financial corporations: they might change name, but fundamentally they remain the same. The newly established PD and PDL (as well as La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno) are exact replicas of the structures defining last year’s political elite. I believe that soon this is likely to instigate a reaction from Grillo.

Unfortunately, Grillo proposes rather traditional solutions to the problems he identifies: he suggests we amend “classical” forms of representation instead of building channels that don’t yet exist or innovative political institutions that have yet to be discovered. We shouldn’t forget, however, that he does heavily criticise the ‘Veltrusconi’ phenomenon, an important problem facing Italian society. The latter, in simple terms, refers to a general trend towards hegemonic political thought. After all, don’t we already know who will win the Italian elections? Clearly it will either be Berlusconi’s ‘Veltronian’ programme or Veltroni’s ‘Berlusconian’ one.

La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno

For a long time we have continued to believe that a new political project for the left was possible, capable of being unified and radical, while still being vast. Unfortunately, the ways in which this project is currently taking shape are outdated and disappointing, meaning we are losing out on a great opportunity. As a result, it will also make the alliance of La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno very fragile after the April elections. Perhaps, the plans of La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno will be short lived, but I see no alternatives. I see no point in either abstaining or in giving a strategic vote to the PD. Instead, I will vote Arcobaleno, not so much for what it is today, but for what it might become in the future. Leaving the doors open for an alternative, somewhere down the line, is the least we can do.

A broken society: fear and longing for quick decisions

At the moment, I see Italian society as being split right down the middle. On one hand, there is a small minority who still yearns for new forms of democratic representation. On the other, however, an overwhelming portion of society has reacted to the rising political insecurity by demanding order, discipline and a tough leadership. There is a craving for authoritarian forms of democracy that will be capable of making fast decisions. This split is increasingly evident and directly related to growing fears and insecurity.

Our society, which is becoming more individualistic and competitive (rather than ‘social’ and ‘cooperative’), has seen most people opting for the easiest path. Instead of asking for schools and hospitals, people are demanding for police and prisons. It is a scenario where people would rather see the poor being eliminated, instead of poverty itself. Unfortunately, this context will lead to more misery, insecurity and isolation, which in turn will encourage people to demand for even more safety and order, falling victim to a terrible vicious circle.

Currently, we run the dangerous risk of creating a negative mass consensus. The only way to balance out this trend is to ensure that the left acts at a social level, by proposing truly innovative, as well as inclusive practices. We must take action before people are pushed to choose order and safety over civil rights and public services.

Tommaso Fattori is Coordinator of Forum Italiano dei Movimenti per l’Acqua, against the privatisation of water and other public services.

Having said this, we must also add that surviving in the Senate with such a small margin of support as the Prodi government had would have required the stamina of a Stalinist leadership endowed with a very firm sense of discipline. Instead, the coalition was made up of a series of undisciplined and fractious parties, which had never given their alliance a proper test-run or forged a common political strategy. They were intent in running the government with a purposely vague political programme.

We all knew this was happening. The only way to shift the difficult equilibrium that the coalition established between such different powers was to give greater weight to that section of society which veered towards the left. This could have been achieved only if we had had the courage to invest in the attempts to achieve unity over the last couple of years, and letting go of jealousies affecting the organisation and identity of parties, which politicians held onto just to preserve their small and traditional electoral strongholds.

Most of all, we must understand (and act accordingly) that the majority of Leftist powers are outside of the four parties making up the ‘Sinistra Arcobaleno’ coalition. To make a difference we would have had to create something truly new, the famous ‘cosa rossa’ (Red Thing – a proposed coalition between the four left parties in the governing coalition – the PRC, PdCI, SD and the Greens – and a broader range of social actors).

Unfortunately, following an assembly meeting that took place in December, which raised the hopes of many, almost nothing was done. The list that has been prepared recently is a good thing, but we must also admit that it isn’t very appetising. Furthermore, little progress was made on the issue of participation by non-members in the coalition of the four parties, the finalisation of its programme and the choice of candidates.

Secondly, it should be mentioned that, even thought the Prodi government wasn’t a pretty sight, Italian society itself has turned rather ugly in the last few years. The government didn’t exactly betray a population that was pushing for social or political change. Unfortunately, people have increasingly lost hope in democracy as a tool for change and have turned to petty, localised and corporate rebellions instead, as well as collectively losing their common values. Essentially, a serious social regression and impoverishment has taken place.

One reason for this, is that Left parties themselves, not to mention the DS, have abandoned social action as a cause (or what was once referred to as ‘foundation work’), deciding instead to hide behind institutions and television.

This way, left-wing associations have gradually lost their grip upon and roots within their territories, leading to the impoverishment we witness today. We lost with the people a long time before we lost at the Senate.

Making up for the mistakes we made in these years won’t be easy. It will take some time. However, we must recognise that there won’t be any shortcuts to take if we wish to regain any hope for a decent government.

For the reasons I have mentioned above, we are approaching the election in a very bad state. We have witnessed the majority of powers making up the Unione take yet another step towards the right and a fracture between the new Democratic Party and the left.

So what hopes do we have to win against Berlusconi? The fact that Casini’s Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e Democratici di Centro (UDC) split from Forza Italia has reduced the strictly bipolar character of the political framework. There is a possibility that, if Veltroni’s Democratic Party (DP) has some degree of success, it might govern by forming alliances with other powers. And there are only two options: they can either form an alliance with Casini on the right, or with La Sinistra Arcobleno on the left. I think it is worth aiming for the latter option, because the level of political degradation is serious and a Berlusconi government would be very dangerous.

Obviously the Sinistra Arcobaleno has to present itself as a very different entity to the DP and very critical of it as well. But this should not mean singling out the DP as their number one enemy and excluding, a priori, a future collaboration with them.

Furthermore the only way to counteract the otherwise inevitable demise of the left by means of a “voto utile” (tactical vote) in favour of the DP – as the only party who has a winning chance against Berlusconi – is to prove that only a strong left will be able to stop the DS from slipping further towards the right in the future. Hence, voting for the Arcobaleno now might prove very useful later.

Luciana Castellina, a journalist and writer, is one the founders of Il Manifesto. She was MP in Italian and EU parliament.

So I find myself in this strange situation. Foreign correspondents in Italy ask me to talk about Berlusconi and convey a sense of how appalling it is that the country is very likely to return to his dominion. European public opinion is deeply worried about the prospect, and not just Left opinion. But in Italy nobody in the parties wants to talk about Berlusconi any more. It’s all ‘old hat’. And behind this lies a great analytical weakness – the failure to take on the question of cultural instruments, especially television, and the necessary guard dog role of public authorities, totally lacking in Italy.

To summarise, then, I think there is a very significant section of the middle classes who could be won to an intellectually renewed and culturally vigorous Sinsitra Arcobaleno. That’s not what we’ve got at the moment. The new party, if it is born, will be born old. The only way to combat this is by what we are trying to do in Florence, and what Paolo Cacciari and friends in the Veneto are doing: build up strong local and regional associations, which push constantly for reform – generational change, gender change, etc., analytical renewal, etc. – and who have the mass membership to back up their demands.

As for Berlusconi and company, all Italy’s history shows that it is basically a right-wing country, heavily influenced by the Vatican. The composition of the Italian middle classes goes very much in his favour, and dependent workers in small family firms tend to vote the way their bosses vote. But there is also a very strong, though minoritarian, tradition of left-wing action and mobilisation. That is far from dead. It now has to be put in an organisational and intellectual context which is radically new. The Sinistra Arcobaleno is absolutely not that at the moment. But it could approximate to it if we move the right way during and after the elections.

Paul Ginsborg is Professor of Contemporary European History at University of Florence and a frequent public commentator on politics and life in Italy. He is the author ofSilvio Berlusconi: Television, Power and Patrimony. (January 2007)

It is a chilling read. Veltroni not only stresses ‘security first’ but, when he outlines his programme for economic growth, he also shows no sign of listening to the social movements that have emerged in the recent years as the only effective force in Italy against the neoliberal wave. Italy’s territory is awash with projects: new highways, high speed rail lines, power plants, oil drilling, liquefied natural gas plants, logistic hubs and so on. The list could suit a post-war reconstruction effort. Yet, for any entry in this shopping list there’s a citizens’ committee, a network, a grassroots movement fighting against it. From the stubborn dwellers of the Susa Valley, near Turin, who have effectively stopped the high-speed rail project, to the bottom of Sicily, where oil drilling projects were equally halted, territorial ‘self-defence’ appears as a new political ground for social movements. Most of these movements are local in the geographical sense only. All of them connect their local issue with a broader picture in which ‘post-development’ often merges with a radical critique of ‘representative democracy’ Italian style.

Veltroni’s bus, albeit green, is set on a collision course with all this. In the twenty months of the Prodi government, it became clear that the scions of the grand Italian leftist tradition have diminished the materialist aspect of society to a pragmatic economic and political agenda. The key word here is ‘hub’: Italy’s position in the Mediterranean, they say, should be the launching pad to transform the country into a hub: from here, goods from Asia, oil and gas from Middle East and Africa can be distributed throughout Europe. The new US bases in Vicenza (Northern Italy) and the enlargement of the US Navy base in Sigonella (Sicily) show the other side of the hub: a military platform from which to project into the same geographical space of ‘incoming entries’ the muscular strength of Nato and future EU warfare tools. In Veltroni’s jargon, this policy has become: ‘Strengthening friendship with the USA’ and an ‘Increased international role for Italy inside the European framework’. Pacifist movements in Italy are already on the alert. On other issues – including sexual discrimination, migrants’ rights, and same sex couples’ rights – Veltroni’s course is ambiguous. He knows he cannot entirely drop this baggage from his bus, but he knows he cannot stress it too much: it would frighten Catholic voters and an increasingly insecure leftist middle class.

The electoral campaign started a bit too early for Veltroni. He wanted to complete his second mandate as mayor of Rome. But the last two years as the capital’s first citizen showed how seriously his programme should be taken. He was spineless toward the undue intrusions of the Vatican and very vocal – and active too – against the ‘perceived security threats’: Romas (gypsies), writers (graffiti), street sellers, migrants… A lot of social movements and NGOs criticised his approach as ‘wrong’. It is becoming increasingly clear that it was not an error but a careful plan.

Labour laws

During the five years of Berlusconi’s Casa delle Liberta coalition government, the centre left promised that once in power it would rewrite the labour laws and abolish the so-called Law 30, introduced by Berlusconi. According to the ILO, the UN’s labour agency, ‘under the pretext of modernising the labour market, [Law 30] caused a serious situation of insecurity in employment.’ According to official statistics, casual and fixed-term contracts are the main means for Italian young workers to enter the labour market today, but it is increasingly rare for these to turn into permanent contracts. Labour market distortions are becoming increasingly pronounced, especially in the south of the country, which is experiencing an alarming fall in the employment rate. The Prodi government’s new Labour and Welfare Act left Law 30 almost untouched, protecting a range of benefits to companies. The Minister of Labour, Cesare Damiano (Democratic Party), a former trade unionist, said that this was the first part of a wider reform and workers would benefit more in a ‘second phase’. Even the leftist trade union, the CGIL, backed the act and the government’s two-phases policy, winning support for it through a referendum among workers. This appeared democratic, but actually the referendum left workers with a choice between supporting the measure or making the government fall.

Public services and common resources

Many of Italy’s social movements were also disappointed at how Prodi dealt with common assets, starting with water. L’Unione’s programme stated that all water services and networks would be nationalised or brought back into public hands, meaning regional and municipal governments. This choice would have reversed the process of local privatisation and liberalisation started in the early 1990s, even by centre-left administrations. L’Unione’s commitment was a response to a national petition signed by 406,000 people. And yet, once in power, l’Unione has done nothing except privatise and liberalise all other local public services. ‘How can you still talk about respect for democracy and support for citizen participation?,’ asked the economist and public-water campaigner Riccardo Petrella in an open letter.

Militarism and international policy

‘I had hoped that under your government our country would have been pulled out of war, any war, as the Constitution foresees. Therefore I did not expect your decision to stay in Afghanistan, nor your policy aimed at involving Italy in the world military-industrial system,’ says Father Alex Zanotelli, a missionary in Africa for the Combonians (Verona Fathers in the UK) and the founder of Italian movements against the war. He too wrote an open letter to Prodi, who had promised the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and said he wanted Italy out of any war. Zanotelli expressed his disappointment at the pro-war policy which in 2007 led to an increase in the defence budget of 12 per cent above Berlusconi’s 2006 budget, to the enlargement of US military bases in Vicenza and Nato bases in Sicily and Naples, and to an agreement to join the US administration’s anti-missile programme together with Poland, thus further dividing EU and provoking Russia. Father Zanotelli also notes that Italy’s international solidarity payments are amongst the most paltry of OECD country. The government could not even find 280 million euro that it had promised during the last G8 meeting for the Global Fund against HIV.

Migration

The Minister of Social Solidarity, Paolo Ferrero (Rifondazione Comunista), tried to rewrite the former, centre-right immigration law, against a tide of anti-migrant hostility. L’Unione’s programme was based on the principles of ‘welcoming, living together, protection’ and was against any criminalisation and demagogy. But the new bill does little to improve the situation for migrant workers, as a residence permit is still linked to a work contract in the highly casualised labour market. The migrant quota system still regulates the immigration flow – there were 655,000 requests for 170,000 permits in 2007 – but it cannot halt illegal immigration with its concomitant exploitation of immigrants. A new law was introduced to bring Italy in line with the EU Directive on refugees and the 1951 Geneva Convention. According to UNHCR spokesperson Laura Boldrini, ‘the bill will facilitate asylum request procedures and will help refugees that flee from wars and persecutions to have better protection’ by providing asylum seekers with renewable residence permits. Last year, nearly 20,000 people reached Italian coasts from Northern Africa and about 500 died while crossing the Mediterranean. Over 30 per cent of them were asylum seekers but just half of them obtained the refugee status.

Vittorio Longhi is an Italian labour and political journalist. He writes for the Italian leftist daily il manifesto and for the CGIL trade union’s weekly Rassegna Sindacale.