Recently, the Chinese president, Hu Jintao insisted that Beijing’s handling of the upheaval was its own affair while the Chinese Ambassador to the UK accused the Western media of demonizing China. At the same time the International Olympic Committee (IOC) reiterated that it will not intervene to pressure China on Tibet or any other political issue.

There is a risk that the perceptions of the West and people in China are drifting in opposite directions. I have witnessed a number of passionate debates between my pro-Tibetan and Chinese friends. The same issues always reoccur: ‘have you been to Tibet?’ ‘why didn’t you raise this before the Olympics?’ and Tibet has been part of China for the last x hundred years. But the outrage should not be targeted against the Chinese people but against the destruction of a way of life by the Chinese state.

The Chinese authorities promised the IOC and the international community concrete improvements in human rights to win the 2008 Olympics for Beijing but nothing much has happened and the recent jailing of human rights activist Hu Jia reflects the hardening stance towards dissent. Sophie Richardson, Asia Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch, declared that ‘Hu Jia’s sentence shows that you can’t defend human rights in China without becoming a case yourself … His arrest was unjustified, his trial unfair and his sentence unwarranted.’  Furthermore, Chinese security forces are still struggling to stamp out flaring violence in areas of Tibetan China.

‘Cultural Genocide?’

The Tibetan revolt of 2008, like those in 1987 and 1959 will be crushed by the overwhelming might of the Chinese military. The current protests are unlikely to result in anything more than the temporary re-imposition of military rule and further repression. As Hu Jintao reiterated the aspirations of greater autonomy, independence or even political unity of the Tibetan areas is extremely threatening to the Chinese state. The Chinese regard Tibet as historically part of China and consider the Dalai Lama, and his followers, as doctrinaire reactionaries opposing the social and economic progress that China brings to what they consider a backward province.

So why do the Tibetans oppose Chinese tutelage and the economic and social progress they have brought? Firstly, many Tibetans feel excluded from the development and money that China pours into their homeland. Chinese migrants are resented by Tibetans, who argue that they take the best jobs. The Dalai Lama has accused China of ‘cultural genocide,’ that this influx has been devastating and with China gaining political, economic and military control in Tibet. The Tibetans have slowly become marginalised and a minority in their own land. China’s consistently uses excessive military force to stifle dissent has resulted in widespread human rights abuses, including political imprisonment, torture and execution. At least 60 deaths have been documented by human rights groups since 1987 and the names of over 700 Tibetan political prisoners have been confirmed. Many are detained without charge or trial under ‘reeducation through labour’ administrative regulations.

China’s crackdown on the monk-led rallies in Lhasa is part of a long history of the Chinese state’s control of the monasteries and Buddhist orders. This started almost as soon as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marched into Tibet in 1950. Following the invasion, Tibet’s culture was suppressed and more than 6000 monasteries, temples and historic buildings were destroyed.

China’s grip on the Buddhist order became very visible in 1995, when the Dalai Lama named the new reincarnation of the Panchen Lama (second only to the Dalai Lama in terms of spiritual seniority). The selected six-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima and his immediate family disappeared within days and his whereabouts remain unknown. The Tibetan government in exile claims he continues to be the youngest political prisoner in the world while the Chinese government asserts he is leading a normal life somewhere in China, his whereabouts secret to protect him. Soon after his disappearance, the Chinese government announced that it had found the real Panchen Lama, a six-year-old who happened to be the son of two Tibetan Communist Party workers. Most monks regard him as a false lama, though he is venerated by ordinary Tibetans.

Beijing 2008

The Chinese and other Olympic supporters argue that the games are about sports and not politics. The promotion of the Olympic spirit, however, includes upholding ethics in sports and encouraging respect for human rights. The games are a sporting event, but nonetheless involve international norms and shared values. The Chinese accuse the Dalai Lama of trying to boycott the games and ignore his repeated statements that he wants the Olympic Games to go ahead. He states that while the Chinese deserve the Games, activists are entitled to nonviolent protests.

Protests and boycotts are part of the Olympics. To mention two examples, in 1908 Irish athletes, angered at the refusal of Britain to give Ireland its independence boycotted the London Games and the 1956 Melbourne Games were boycotted by Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon because of the Suez invasion by Britain and France. The biggest boycott took place in 1980 when 62 countries led by the United States stayed away from Moscow following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the previous year.

It is still unclear what affect the crisis in Tibet will have in the long-term. The options for Tibetans are changing, many are increasingly frustrated as they see little sign of progress after decades of waiting. Young Tibetans are becoming increasingly impatient with the Dalai Lama’s peaceful means. Although they remain loyal, they believe that confrontation might be more effective for securing their rights. While the spotlight is still on China, it cannot afford to crack down too hard on the Tibetan people. During the last upheaval in 1987, very few in the West knew where Tibet was, let alone its tragic history. The Chinese government responded with executions, arbitrary arrests and torture. China was still a relatively isolated country and did not need international opinion on their side. Nineteen years on, much has changed, The Dalai Lama has raised Tibet’s profile and China has ‘opened up.’ Admitted to the WTO, secured billions in corporate capital and is hosting the 2008 Olympics, nonetheless, as the Burmese can testify, public and media attention can shift very quickly. Many of those protesting in Tibet know they might die in one of the many secret prison cells. When the world is no longer watching, they might be killed along with those that risked all to get the focus of the world.

Carole Reckinger is a freelance writer, more of her articles can be read at http://1000forgottenstories.wordpress.com/

On the day of the attack a state of emergency was instated and arrest warrants issued against 17 people. Among them, Gastao Salsinha, reportedly in command of the defectors after their leader Alfredo Reinado, a former military police major, was killed during the attack on Ramos-Horta.

Incredulity and anger prevails in Dili. International forces dispatched to Timor-Leste to keep the peace have met with harsh criticism for their failure to prevent the attack. The incident has also triggered anger and distrust among the population. However, the significance of the attack does not lie in the security forces failings.

The assault on the supreme constitutional symbols – prime minister and president- the very heroes of the liberation struggle, lays bare Timor’s national identity crisis. Not only because the country was so close to losing its icons but because it lost its newest icon in Alfredo Reinado. He was given a hero’s burial in Dili, his coffin draped in the Timorese flag and, as BBC article reports, ‘his bearded face looked down defiantly from banners in a revolutionary pose that deliberately aped the portraits they used to host of Xanana Gusmao.’

Military and police under a single command

In an attempt to catch Reinado’s men East Timor’s authorities have merged police and army under a single command.

The underlying rationale that it is necessary to guarantee the adequate mobilisation of security and defence forces during the state of exception. But the decision has sparked criticism.  The lack of a clear separation between internal and external security may be fatal for the nascent security institutions and lead to tension as it did in 2006. Then, after the sacking of mutinous soldiers, rioting resulted in at least 37 deaths and the displacement of over 150,000 people.

The 2006 crisis and the breakdown of security forces

In April 2006 Dili went up in flames after 600 soldiers protested against discrimination within the ranks of the newly formed Timorese army. The protesters, ‘or petitioners’, were summarily dismissed. Clashes between elements of the national police force (PNTL) and the military (F-FDTL) led to a power vacuum and the breakdown of law and order across the country.

Neither the PNTL nor the F-FDTL had the trust of the population or the capacity to provide adequate security and order. Repeated allegations of sexual harassment, human rights violations, illegal weapons distribution and engagement in illicit trade weakened the public’s confidence in the PNTL in particular. As the 2006 crisis demonstrated neither police nor military were politically neutral, both institutions fragmented due to mixed regional and political loyalties in the ranks, although ethnic and regional divisions had not previously been prominent in Timor-Leste.

With the collapse of the security sector and law and order in general, a multinational peacekeeping force was requested to restore order in late May 2006. Since then efforts have been made to resolve the multiple issues affecting both institutions, but reversing the breakdown is not a simple task.

Reinado, the symbol of a disillusioned Timor-Leste

Reinado, one of the leaders of the mutineers, emerged from the 2006 crisis as a key player. His popularity is remarkable, even after apparently leading an attack on the two most prominent (living) heroes of the liberation struggle. A BBC report cautioned that ‘there is something worrying about the readiness of East Timor’s young to pass the hero’s mantle on to a man like Reinado, who took up arms against the government in the chaos of May 2006 and refused to lay them down. Reinado had nothing to offer East Timor except the continued idealisation of armed struggle as an alternative to the unglamorous task of building a country from very little.’

But analysis such as the BBC’s cites overemphasises the institutional failings of the Timorese state and pays little attention to the role of popular perception in articulating the country’s predicament. The crisis exists as much on the streets of Dili as it does at the state level. It is not quite as simple as glamour versus nation building. Nation building is a highly political moment, particularly after a major political crisis, and politics are key to Reinado’s popularity. But to understand his popular appeal focus must shift away from the institutional context and to a major societal crisis that has been ongoing since 2006- internal displacement.

Internal displacement

The vast majority of the persons displaced during the 2006 crisis have not returned to their homes. About 100,000 refugees remain in camps. Of these, 30,000 are in the capital Dili. To reduce camp populations and fearing some camps would become permanent, authorities decided to cut food rations in February 2008 with food aid ending completely by March 2008. But with the state of emergency this decision could not have come at a worse time.

Atul Khare, UN Special Representative for the Secretary General in Timor-Leste, has explained that resettlement is extremely complex, because it involves addressing land and property issues and community hostility. The UN humanitarian coordinator also said that ‘for many IDPs [internally Displaced People] it is simply not an option for them to return to their neighbourhoods as the people there don’t want them back… Six thousand of their houses have been burned and only 450 transitional shelters have been built to date. There is nowhere to go back to.’

The rise and fall of Alfredo Reinado

Reinado became a symbol of the disenfranchised – youths, the poor, veterans -and key to balancing peace in East Timor. Shortly after his arrest in 2006, he escaped from Becora prison along with 56 other inmates, later boasting that he waved at New Zealand soldiers as he left. In March 2007 the president at this time, Xanana Gusmao, sanctioned an Australian operation to capture Reinado after his men raided weapons from a police post. The operation resulted in several deaths but Reinado eluded capture, his popularity growing among Dili youths. He was able to represent the projected hopes of many of those for whom independence brought more disappointment and poverty.

Reinado was a liability but also bold and charismatic. His defiant messages to the authorities and vanishing acts made him a romantic figure that resonated with a generation that had lost its heroes. Journalist Max Stahl has likened him to Che Guevara, ‘a poster figure on laptops, and graffiti sketches around Dili.’

While most media reports have been quick to qualify the attacks as a coup or assassination attempt, others are more cautious. The emerging theory is Reinado was losing his support base among the petitioners. It is likely the attack, increasingly rumoured to have been an attempted kidnapping rather than an assassination attempt or coup, was a pre-emptive move to prevent the impending defection of his support base.

There is a thin line between rumour, misinformation and premature conclusions as reported in the media. Observers have increasingly focused on the fact very little is known about what actually happened on the morning of the 11 February. As one blogger has observed, even of what little is known there are conflicting reports:

‘I have heard/read “Alfredo shot in a bedroom/shot at the front gate”, “shooting started at 6:50am versus Alfredo shot 30 minutes before the President”, “kidnap not assassination”, “PM Xanana knew nothing about what happened 40 minutes before / made fully aware”, my cyclist friend [who warned the President of gun-shots when he was returning home from his morning exercise, moments before he was shot] has been elevated to diplomat but downgraded to jogger.’

Reinado’s popularity even after his death attests to a social reality that is quite different from what appears in the international media-the hero of the disenfranchised, rather than the outlandish renegade. Timor-Leste may have lost its most recent hero in Reinado but the nature of his achievements is perhaps more emblematic of Timor-Leste’s youths’ frustrations and loss of purpose.

Sara Gonzalez Devant and Carole Reckinger are freelance writers who worked in Timor-Leste between 2005-2006.

More of their articles can be viewed at http://1000forgottenstories.wordpress.com/